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Abstract. This paper considers the problem of checking whether an organization conforms to a body of regulation. Conformance is cast as a trace checking
question – the regulation is represented in a logic that is evaluated against an abstract trace or run representing the operations of an organization. We focus on a
problem in designing a logic to represent regulation.
A common phenomenon in regulatory texts is for sentences to refer to others for
conditions or exceptions. We motivate the need for a formal representation of
regulation to accomodate such references between statements. We then extend
linear temporal logic to allow statements to refer to others. The semantics of the
resulting logic is defined via a combination of techniques from Reiter’s default
logic and Kripke’s theory of truth.

1 Introduction
Regulations, laws, and policies that affect many aspects of our lives are represented
predominantly as documents in natural language. For example, the Food and Drug Administration’s Code of Federal Regulations [1] (FDA CFR) governs the operations of
American bloodbanks. The CFR is framed by experts in the field of medicine, and regulates the tests that need to be performed on donations of blood before they are used. In
such safety-critical scenarios, it is desirable to assess formally whether an organization
(bloodbank) conforms to the regulation (CFR).
There is a growing interest in using formal methods to assist organizations in complying with regulation [2–4]. Assisting an organization in compliance involves a number of tasks related to the notion of a violation. For example, it is of interest to detect or
prevent violations, assign blame, and if possible, recover from violations. In this paper,
we focus on conformance checking which involves detecting the presence of violations.
We cast conformance checking as a trace-checking question. The regulation is translated to statements in a logic which are evaluated against a trace or run representing the
operations of an organization. The result of evaluation is either an affirmative answer to
conformance, or a counterexample representing a subset of the operations of the organization and the specific law that is violated.
⋆
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There are two important features of regulatory texts that need to be accomodated
by a representation in logic. First, regulations convey constraints on an organization’s
operations, and these constraints can be obligatory (required) or permitted (optional).
Second, statements in regulation refer to others for conditions or exceptions. An organization conforms to a body of regulation iff it satisfies all the obligations. However,
permissions provide exceptions to obligations, indirectly affecting conformance. Our
formulation of obligations and permissions follows the theory of Ross [5], and we will
discuss the relationship to other theories (cf. [6]) in Section 3.1.
The central focus of this work is the function of regulatory sentences as conditions
or exceptions to others. This function of sentences makes them dependent on others for
their interpretation, and makes the translation to logic difficult. We call this the problem
of references to other laws. In Section 2, we argue that a logic to represent regulation
should provide mechanisms for statements to refer to others. We provide motivation
using examples from the FDA CFR. We discuss how these sentences can be represented
in a logic without references, and conclude that this would make the translation difficult.
We then turn to the task of defining a logic that lets statements refer to and reason about others. In Section 3.1, we define a trace or run-based representation for the
operations of an organization, and a predicate-based linear temporal logic (PredLTL)
to make assertions about runs. PredLTL is extended to express two kinds of normative
statements (obligations and permissions), leading to a formal definition of conformance.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we extend PredLTL to allow references between laws
thereby making permissions relevant to conformance. Specifically, we introduce an
inference predicate, whose interpretation is determined by inferences from laws. The
justifications in default logic [7] can be cast as an instance of this predicate. Default
logic has been used in computing extensions to a theory, in the manner of logic programs [8, 9]. In conformance checking, we need to separate two uses of statements: (a)
extending a theory (the regulation), and (b) determining facts about an organization.
This separation is achieved using the inference predicate. Statements are evaluated using the fixed points of an appropriate function, based on a technique used in Kripke’s
theory of truth [10]. An axiomatization is discussed in Section 3.4.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of related and future work.

2 Motivation
In this section, we argue that a logic to represent regulation should provide a mechanism
for sentences to refer to others. We discuss shortened versions of sentences from the
CFR Section 610.40, which we will use as a running example throughout the paper.
Consider the following sentences:
(1) Except as specified in (2), every donation of blood or blood component must be
tested for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
(2) You are not required to test donations of source plasma for evidence of infection
due to Hepatitis B.
Statement (1) conveys an obligation to test donations of blood or blood component
for Hepatitis B, and (2) conveys a permission not to test a donation of source plasma
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(a blood component) for Hepatitis B. To assess an organization’s conformance to (1)
and (2), it suffices to check whether “All non-source plasma donations are tested for
Hepatitis B”. In other words, (1) and (2) imply the following obligation:
(3) Every non-source plasma donation must be tested for evidence of infection due
to Hepatitis B.
There are a variety of logics in which one can capture the interpretation of (3), as
needed for conformance. Now suppose we have a sentence that refers to (1):
(4) To test for Hepatitis B, you must use a screening test kit.
The reference is more indirect here, but the interpretation is: “If (1) requires a test,
then the test must be performed using a screening test kit”. A bloodbank is not prevented
from using a different kind of test for source plasma donations. (4) can be represented
by first producing (3), and then inferring that (3) and (4) imply the following:
(5) Every non-source plasma donation must be tested for evidence of infection due
to Hepatitis B using a screening test kit.
It is easy to represent the interpretation of (5) directly in a logic. However, (5) has
a complex relationship to the sentences from which it was derived, i.e., (1), (2) and (4).
The derivation takes the form of a tree:
(5)
(3)
(1)

(4)
(2)

To summarize, if one wishes to use a logic with no support for referring to other
sentences, derived obligations must be created manually. We argue that the manual creation of derived obligations is impractical in terms of the amount of effort involved. We
give two (pragmatic) reasons. First, the derived obligation can become very complex.
The full version of statement (1) in the CFR contains six exceptions, and these exceptions in turn have statements that qualify them further. It is difficult to inspect a derived
obligation, and determine if it captures the intended interpretation of the sentences from
which it came. Second, references between laws are frequent, amplifying the effort in
creating a logic representation. In [11], we discuss lexical statistics which suggest that
references are a common way of establishing relationships between sentences in the
CFR, and [12, 3] point out their frequency in other bodies of regulation.
We advocate an approach that allows us to introduce references into the syntax of
the logic, and resolve references during evaluation.

3 Representing Regulatory Documents in Logic
In this section, we extend linear temporal logic (LTL) to distinguish between obligations
and permissions, and allow references between statements. We begin, in Section 3.1, by
representing a bloodbank as a run or trace. LTL is extended to distinguish between
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obligations and permissions, leading to definitions of conformance. We then extend
the logic to allow sentences to refer to others. Section 3.2 gives an informal exampledriven account, and Section 3.3 provides a formal account. In Section 3.4, we discuss
an axiomatization.
Sections 3.1 is intended as background, in which we discuss several underlying
assumptions. Our goal is to focus on the problem of references, and to treat the representation of obligations and permissions as an important but orthogonal issue.
3.1 Predicate-based Linear Temporal Logic (PredLTL)
Representing regulated operations: Given the need to demonstrate conformance to
the regulation in case of an audit, regulated organizations such as bloodbanks keep
track of their operations in a database, for example, donor information and the tests they
perform. Such a system can be thought of abstractly as a relational structure evolving
over time. At each point in time (state), there are a set of objects (such as donations and
donors) and relations between the objects (such as an association between a donor and
her donations). The state changes by the creation, removal or modification of objects.
We represent this as a run.
Definition 1 (A Run of a System). Given a set O (of objects) and countable sets
Φ1 , ..., Φn (where Φj is a set of predicate names of arity j), a run of a system R(O,
Φ1 , ..., Φn ), abbreviated as R, is a tuple (r, π1 , ..., πn ) where:
– r : N → S is a sequence of states. N is the set of natural numbers, and S is a set
of states.
j
– πj : Φj × S → 2O is a truth assignment to predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ Φj ,
we will say that p(o1 , ..., oj ) is true at state s iff (o1 , ..., oj ) ∈ πj (p, s).
Given a run R and a time i ∈ N , the pair (R, i) is called a point (statements in
linear temporal logic are evaluated at points). Given the predicate names (Φ1 , ..., Φn ),
the corresponding space of runs is denoted by R(Φ1 , ..., Φn ), abbreviated as R.
Conceivably, we could construct a state-transition diagram representing all possible
behaviors of the system and explore conformance from the model checking perspective
(e.g., [13]). We chose to restrict our attention to traces for two reasons. First, checking
of traces is easier to explain, and all interesting theoretical and algorithmic aspects that
we explore in this paper manifest themselves in trace checking. Second, many parts
of the operations of an organization, such as a bloodbank, do not involve computers.
A complete model of operations has to include a model of human users, which is a
research problem in its own right that is well beyond the scope of this paper. However,
if a finite-state model of an organization can be created, the propositional version of the
logic developed here can be adapted to work with available model-checkers.
Representing the regulation: The logic that we define in this section is a restricted
fragment of first-order modal logic. The restriction is that we allow formulas with free
variables, but no quantification over objects. Formulas will be interpreted using the universal generalization rule, i.e., over all assignments to free variables. The restrictions
are similar in spirit to the logic programing approaches to regulation [8, 9]. PredLTL is
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less expressive than the variants of first-order logic used by [2, 4]. However, when references are added, the logic becomes more expressive than first-order logic (Section 3.3).
Definition 2 (Syntax). Given sets Φ1 , ..., Φn (of predicate names) and a set of variables
X, the language L(Φ1 , ..., Φn , X), abbreviated as L, is the smallest set such that:
– p(y1 , ..., yj ) ∈ L where p ∈ Φj and (y1 , ..., yj ) ∈ X j .
– If ϕ ∈ L, then ¬ϕ ∈ L and 2ϕ ∈ L. If ϕ, ψ ∈ L, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L.
Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and implication ϕ ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ are derived
connectives. The temporal operator is understood in the usual way: 2ϕ (ϕ holds and
will always hold (globally)). 3ϕ (ϕ will eventually hold) is defined as ¬2¬ϕ.
We now extend the syntax to express normative statements in a body of regulation,
by distinguishing between obligations and permissions.
Definition 3 (Syntax of Regulation). Given a finite set of identifiers ID, a body of
regulation Reg is a set of statements such that for each id ∈ ID, there exist ϕ, ψ ∈ L
such that either: id.o: ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg, or id.p: ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg
id.o: ϕ ; ψ (id.p: ϕ ; ψ) is read as: “it is obligated (permitted) that the precondition ϕ leads to the postcondition ψ”. The distinction between preconditions and
postconditions corresponds to the distinction between input and output in input-output
logic [14].
Definition 4 (Semantics). Given a run R = (r, π1 , ..., πn ), i ∈ N , ϕ ∈ L, and an
assignment v : X → O, the relation (R, i, v) |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
– (R, i, v) |= p(y1 , ..., yj ) iff (o1 , ..., oj ) ∈ πj (p, r(i)) where ok = v(yk ) if yk ∈ O.
– The semantics of conjunction and negation is defined in the usual way.
– (R, i, v) |= 2ϕ iff for all k ≥ i : (R, k, v) |= ϕ
We extend the semantic relation to regulatory statements. We take |= to stand for
“conforms to”:
– (R, i, v) |= id.o: ϕ ; ψ iff (R, i, v) |= ϕ ⇒ ψ (⇒ is implication)
– (R, i, v) |= id.p: ϕ ; ψ. Runs vacuously conform to permissions. Permissions will
become relevant when references from obligations are present (Section 3.2).
Consider again our example from Section 2. We use three predicates defined as
follows. d(x) is true iff x is a donation. sp(x) is true iff x consists of source plama.
test(x) is true iff x is tested for Hepatitis B. Statement (3) is represented as:
3.o: d(x) ∧ ¬sp(x) ; 3test(x)
Statement (2) is be represented as: 2.p: d(y) ∧ sp(y) ; ¬3test(y). However,
statement (1) cannot be represented directly.
We will now define conformance, and then discuss the various definitions in the
context of related work. Given a run R, let V (R) denote the set of variable assignments.
Conformance is defined using the notion of validity. A formula ϕ is valid at the point
(R, i), denoted (R, i) |= ϕ, iff for all v ∈ V (R): (R, i, v) |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid
on R iff it is valid at all points, that is, R |= ϕ iff for all i ∈ N : (R, i) |= ϕ.
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Definition 5 (Run Conformance). Given a body of regulation Reg and a run R representing the operations of an organization, we say that R conforms to the regulation
iff for all obligations id.o: ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg, we have R |= id.o: ϕ ; ψ.
Discussion: The deontic concepts of obligation and permission are treated as properties
of sentences. Only obligations matter for conformance. If a non-source plasma donation
is not tested, there is a problem. On the other hand, a bloodbank may choose to test a
donation of source plasma or not. In assessing conformance, the function of a permission is to serve as an exception to an obligation, and in this indirect manner it becomes
relevant. We will give a semantics to this function of permissions in Section 3.2. Such
a treatment of permissions has its basis in the legal theory of Ross [5].
Ross’ approach to permission is by no means the only one. Theories have distinguished between various kinds of permission (cf. [6]), the most common distinction
being that of positive and negative permission. We discuss the analysis by Makinson
and van der Torre [15]. ϕ is said to positively permitted iff it is explictly permitted by
the laws, and ϕ is negatively permitted iff it is not forbidden. The key issue is whether
positive permissions can give rise to violations. In regulations phrased exclusively in
terms of permissions, it is desirable to say that if ϕ denotes a “relevant” condition
which is not explicitly permitted, then it should not hold in conforming implementations. While this has been analysed as a property of permission, following Ross, we
take such violations as arising from an implicit obligation, i.e., the italicized clause.
This implicit obligation can be represented using the techniques we discuss in Section
3.2, provided that the relevance of the condition is known.
In the formulation here, obligations and permissions are top-level operators and
cannot be negated. This restriction can be removed by treating obligation and permission as KD modalities (c.f. [16]), and using a many-valued interpretation to decide if a
run belongs to the set of ideal runs. However, we avoid this to simplify presentation. A
more crucial restriction is that iterated deontic constructs cannot be expressed directly,
i.e., sentences of the form “required to allow x” or “allowed to require x.”. One has to
decide what top-level obligations or permissions are implied by these constructs. To our
knowledge, handling iterated constructs is an open problem in deontic logic [17].
3.2 References to Other Laws – An Informal Description
In this section, we give an informal account of reference logic (RefL), which is used
to handle references. We extend the syntax of PredLTL with an inference predicate
byId (ϕ), where Id is a set of identifiers. byId (ϕ) is read as “by the laws in Id, ϕ holds”.
There are two restrictions: (a) ϕ is a statement in PredLTL (Definition 2) and (b) the
predicate byId (ϕ) can appear only in preconditions of laws. These restrictions are similar to those that apply to justifications in default logic [7].
Consider again our example statements (1) and (2), which are represented in RefL
as follows:
– 1.o: d(x) ∧ ¬by{2} (ϕ(x)) ; 3test(x), and
– 2.p: d(y) ∧ sp(y) ; ¬3test(y)
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In the obligation above, the subformula by{2} (ϕ(x)) is understood as “by the law (2)
the formula ϕ(x) holds”. It remains to define the formula ϕ(x). Intuitively, this should
be the negation of the postcondition of (1). In other words, if ¬3test(x) follows from
(2), then the postcondition of (1) need not hold. This gives us:
1.o: d(x) ∧ ¬by{2} (¬3test(x)) ; 3test(x)
We interpret the predicate by{2} (¬3test(x)), by letting formulas have output. In
other words, when the precondition of an obligation or permission is true at a point, the
point is annotated with the postcondition.

Time Objects Predicates
1
o1
d(o1 ), sp(o1 ), ¬test(o1 )
2
o1
d(o1 ), sp(o1 ), ¬test(o1 )
o2
d(o2 ), ¬sp(o2 ), ¬test(o2 )
3
o1
d(o1 ), sp(o1 ), test(o1 )
o2
d(o2 ), ¬sp(o2 ), ¬test(o2 )

Annotations
2: ¬3test(o1 )
2: ¬3test(o1 )
1: 3test(o2 )
2: ¬3test(o1 )
1: 3test(o2 )

Table 1. A run and its annotations

Table 1 shows a run of a bloodbank augmented with annotations. First, an object
o1 is entered into the system. o1 is a donation of source plasma (d(o1 ) and sp(o1 ) are
true). When a donation is added, its test predicate is initially false. Then, an object o2
is added, which is a donation but not of source plasma. In the third step, the object o1
is tested. At this point, unless the run is extended to test o2 as well, it does not conform
with the regulation. We now discuss how the annotations are arrived at and used to
assess the regulation.
We begin by defining an annotation. Given a run R, an assignment v ∈ V (R), and
ϕ ∈ L, v(ϕ) is the formula obtained by replacing all variables x by the unique name for
the object v(x). We assume that all variables are free. Note that v(ϕ) is equivalent to
a propositional LTL formula, as the variables have been replaced by constant symbols.
An annotation, id: v(ϕ), is a propositional LTL formula associated with an identifier.
Given a point (R, i) and an assignment v ∈ V (R), first we consider the permission
2.p: d(y) ∧ sp(y) ; ¬3test(y). If (R, i, v) |= d(y) ∧ sp(y), then (R, i) is annotated
with 2: v(¬3test(y)). Otherwise, there is no annotation.
Since the precondition of statement (2) is true for the assignment of y to o1 , we
have the annotation 2: ¬3test(o1 ) at all points. However, since o2 is not a donation of
source plasma, there is no correponding annotation.
Now consider the formula by{2} (¬3test(x)). This is evaluated as follows. We evaluate 2.p: d(y) ∧ sp(y) ; ¬3test(y) at (R, i) w.r.t. all variable assignments. Let ψ2 be
the conjunction of the annotations produced by the formula for (2).
(R, i, v) |= by{2} (¬3test(x)) iff |= ψ2 ⇒ v(¬3test(x))
Notice that this requires a validity check in propositional LTL, which can be decided
in space polynomial in the size of the formula [18].
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Returning to the run in Table 1, the states are annotated with 2: ¬3test(o1 ) and |=
¬3test(o1 ) ⇒ ¬3test(o1 ), since ϕ ⇒ ϕ is a propositional tautology. So (R, i, v) |=
by{2} (¬3test(x)) when v(x) = o1 .
We can evaluate 1.o: d(x) ∧ ¬by{2} (¬3test(x)) ; 3test(x) similarly by annotating states with 3test(x) if the precondition holds. In Table 1, this results in an
annotation of 1: 3test(o2 ) on the appropriate states. If o2 is never tested, the run will
be declared non-conforming (by Definition 5), but the annotation will remain. This lets
a law which depends on (1) draw the correct inference.
3.3 Reference Logic (RefL)
The semantic evaluation outlined in Section 3.2 works only when the references are
acyclic, since an order of evaluation needs to be defined. To handle cycles, we adopt
a fixed-point technique from Kripke’s theory of truth [10]. The idea is to move to a
three-valued logic where the third (middle) value stands for ungrounded. Initially, all
statements are ungrounded and there are no annotations. Using an inflationary function, we add annotations until a fixed point in reached. In this section, we define this
inflationary function and show that it has least and maximal fixed points. We begin by
extending the syntax described in Section 3.1:
Definition 6 (Syntax of Preconditions). Given sets Φ1 , ..., Φn (of predicate names), a
set of variables X, and a finite set of identifiers ID, the language L′ (Φ1 , ..., Φn , X, ID),
abbreviated as L′ , is the smallest set such that:
– p(y1 , ..., yj ) ∈ L′ where p ∈ Φj and (y1 , ..., yj ) ∈ X j .
– If ϕ ∈ L′ , then ¬ϕ ∈ L′ and 2ϕ ∈ L′ . If ϕ, ψ ∈ L′ , then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L′
– If Id ⊆ ID and ϕ ∈ L(Φ1 , ..., Φn , X) (Definition 2), then byId (ϕ) ∈ L′
The syntax of regulatory statements (Definition 3) is modified so that the preconditions of laws are statements from L′ . We use id.x : ϕ ; ψ to stand for a normative
statement (either obligation or permission). We now define an annotation:
Definition 7 (Annotation). Given a run R, a set of identifiers ID, a body of regulation
Reg and v ∈ V (R), an annotation is a statement id: v(ψ) such that id ∈ ID and id.x :
ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg. The set of annotations is denoted by A(R, ID, Reg), abbreviated A.
Definition 8 (Annotation Function). Given a run R, an annotation function α : N →
2A assigns a set of annotations to each point. We use α.Id(i) to denote the set of
annotations id: ψ ∈ α(i) such that id ∈ Id.
We will formalize the semantics using the fixed point technique outlined in [10].
Before we turn to the formal definitions, we sketch some of the key ideas involved.
Let us assume as given a run R. Statements in L′ and Reg are divided into three
classes corresponding to true (T(i, v)), false (F(i, v)) and ungrounded (U(i, v)) for all
times i ∈ N and assignments v ∈ V (R). Intuitively, U(i, v) is the set of statements
that are waiting for the evaluation of another statement.
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As we discussed in Section 3.2, to determine whether byId (ϕ) ∈ T(i, v), we need
to check if there is a set of annotations which imply v(ϕ). We construct the annotation
function α such that for all assignments v, we have id: v(ψ) ∈ α(i) iff ϕ ∈ T(i, v) for
some id.x : ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg and id ∈ Id. We will say that byId (ϕ) ∈ T(i, v) only if
α.Id(i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is not satisfiable.
To determine whether byId (ϕ) ∈ F(i, v), we need to ensure that there is no ungrounded statement that could make it true. To check this condition, we construct the
annotation function α′ such that id: v(ψ) ∈ α′ (i) iff ϕ ∈ T(i, v) ∪ U(i, v) for some
id.x : ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg and id ∈ Id. The condition for falsity w.r.t. α′ is simply the
negation of the condition for truth w.r.t. α. More formally, byId (ϕ) ∈ F(i, v) only if
α′ .Id(i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is satisfiable.
When there are circular references, one cannot always evaluate a statement to be true
or false. The Nixon-diamond problem (introduced in [7]) is a well-known example. We
rephrase it in “legalese”:
(6) Except as otherwise specified, Quakers must be pacifists.
(7) Except as otherwise specified, Republicans must not be pacifists.
These statements can be represented in RefL as follows:
6.o: q(x) ∧ ¬by{6,7} (¬p(x)) ; p(x), and
7.o: r(x) ∧ ¬by{6,7} (p(x)) ; ¬p(x)
Suppose we are given a state with an individual n (for Nixon), who is both quaker
and republican, i.e., q(n) and r(n) hold. How should we evaluate the statements above?
[10] suggests two answers to this question: (A) The statements are neither true or false
(they are ungrounded). This corresponds to skeptical reasoning in non-monotonic logic.
(B) Exactly one of by{6,7} (p(n)) and by{6,7} (¬p(n)) is true, which leads us to conclude p(n) (by (6)) or ¬p(n) (by (7)) resply. This corresponds to credulous reasoning
in non-monotonic logic.
In the semantics we give below, different answers correspond to different fixed
points. We refer the reader to [10] for examples and discussion of the various possibilities with regard to fixed points. The choice of what to do when there are multiple
fixed points depends on the application, and we discuss this issue further at the end of
this section.
Definition 9 (Evaluation). Given a run R and a body of regulation Reg, an evaluation
is a tuple E = (T, F, U), where T, F and U are functions of the form N × V (R) →
+
2L , where L+ = Reg ∪ L′ . Furthermore, for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V (R), we have
+
T(i, v) ∩ F(i, v) = ∅ and U(i, v) = 2L − (T(i, v) ∪ F(i, v)).
Given an evaluation E, αE is the annotation such that for all i ∈ N and id ∈ ID,
we have id: v(ψ) ∈ αE (i) iff ϕ ∈ T(i, v), where id.x : ϕ ; ψ ∈ Reg. Similarly, α′E
is the annotation such that id: v(ψ) ∈ α′E (i) iff ϕ ∈ T(i, v) ∪ U(i, v).
Definition 10 (Consistent Evaluation). An evaluation E is consistent iff for all i ∈ N
and v ∈ V (R), T(i, v) = F(i, v) = ∅, or T(i, v) and F(i, v) are sets such that:
1. p(x1 , ..., xj ) ∈ T(i, v) iff (v(x1 ), ..., v(xj )) ∈ πj (p, r(i))
p(x1 , ..., xj ) ∈ F(i, v) iff (v(x1 ), ..., v(xj )) 6∈ πj (p, r(i))

10

Nikhil Dinesh, Aravind Joshi, Insup Lee, and Oleg Sokolsky

2. If φ ∈ T(i, v) and ψ ∈ T(i, v), then φ ∧ ψ ∈ T(i, v)
If φ ∈ F(i, v) or ψ ∈ F(i, v), then φ ∧ ψ ∈ F(i, v)
and similarly for negation and temporal operators
3. If ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ T(i, v), then id.o: ϕ ; ψ ∈ T(i, v)
If ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ F(i, v), then id.o: ϕ ; ψ ∈ F(i, v)
id.p: ϕ ; ψ ∈ T(i, v). Runs vacuously conform to permissions.
4. If byId (ϕ) ∈ T(i, v), then αE .Id(i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is not satisfiable.
If byId (ϕ) ∈ F(i, v), then α′E .Id(i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is satisfiable.
The set of all consistent evaluations for a run R and regulation Reg is denoted by
E(R, Reg), abbreviated E.
Observe that in consistent evaluations, if byId (ϕ) ∈ T(i, v), then αE .Id(i) ∪
{v(¬ϕ)} is not satisfiable (Clause 4 in Definition 10). The converse need not be true.
Definition 11 (Partial Order). Given evaluations E1 = (T1 , F1 , U1 ) and E2 =
(T2 , F2 , U2 , α2 ), we say that E1 ≤ E2 iff for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V (R), T1 (i, v) ⊆
T2 (i, v) and F1 (i, v) ⊆ F2 (i, v).
The pair (E, ≤), where E is the set of consistent evaluations is a partially ordered
set (poset).
We now define the inflationary function whose fixed points we will be interested in.
Definition 12 (Inflationary function). Given (E, ≤), the function I : E → E is defined
as follows. Given a consistent evaluation E1 = (T1 , F1 , U1 ), I(E1 ) is the smallest
consistent evaluation E2 = (T2 , F2 , U2 ) such that E1 ≤ E2 , for all i ∈ N and
v ∈ V (R), T2 (i, v) 6= ∅, F2 (i, v) 6= ∅, and E2 extends E1 .
We say that E2 extends E1 iff for all i ∈ N and assignments v ∈ V (R):
If αE1 (i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is not satisfiable, then byId (ϕ) ∈ T2 (i, v)
If α′E1 (i) ∪ {v(¬ϕ)} is satisfiable, then byId (ϕ) ∈ F2 (i, v)
It remains to show that I is well-defined, has maximal fixed points and a unique
least fixed point. We give a brief sketch here, and refer the reader to [19] for detailed
proofs.
Proposition 1. Given (E, ≤) and E1 ∈ E, let E2 ⊆ E be the set of consistent evaluations such that E2 ∈ E2 iff E1 ≤ E2 , for all i and v, T2 (i, v) 6= ∅, F2 (i, v) 6= ∅, and
E2 extends E1 . Then, E2 has a smallest element.
The existence of fixed points is established using Zorn’s lemma, which applies to
chain-complete posets. Given the poset (E, ≤), a set E ′ ⊆ E is called a chain (totally
ordered set) iff for all E1 , E2 ∈ E ′ , we have E1 ≤ E2 or E2 ≤ E1 . A poset is chain
complete iff every chain has a supremum. The following can be shown:
Proposition 2. (E, ≤) is a chain-complete poset.
Lemma 1 (Zorn (c.f. [20])). Every chain complete poset has a maximal element
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The existence of maximal fixed points is immediate from Zorn’s lemma and the fact
that I is inflationary, i.e., E ≤ I(E). Let E ∗ be a maximal element in E, since E ∗ is
maximal and E ∗ ≤ I(E ∗ ) it follows that E ∗ = I(E ∗ ).
To show the existence of a least fixed point, as [10] notes, we will need the observation that I is monotonic, i.e., if E1 ≤ E2 then I(E1 ) ≤ I(E2 ). This can be shown
by an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 1. With monotonicity, we obtain the
following corollary to Zorn’s lemma:
Corollary 1. Given E1 ∈ E, let σ(E1 ) be the smallest set such that: (a) E1 in E, (b)
if E ∈ σ(E1 ) then I(E) ∈ σ(E1 ), and (c) if C ⊆ σ(E1 ) is a non-empty chain, then
Esc ∈ σ(E1 ), where Esc is the supremum of C w.r.t. E. Then:
1. σ(E1 ) is a chain whose supremum is a fixed point of I
2. σ(E1 ) contains a unique fixed point
3. If E1 ≤ E2 , then Es1 ≤ Es2 , where Es1 and Es2 are the suprema of σ(E1 ) and
σ(E2 ) resply., and
4. I has a unique least fixed point.
The first claim follows from a technique to prove Zorn’s lemma [20]. The second
and third claims follow from the first using monotonicity. And, for the last claim, consider the evaluation E0 = (T0 , F0 , U0 ), where for all i ∈ N , v ∈ V (R), T0 (i, v) =
+
F0 (i, v) = ∅, and U0 (i, v) = 2L . Since E0 ≤ E for all E ∈ E, it follows from the
third claim that σ(E0 ) is the least fixed point. The results are summarized in the following theorem, which provides a base for extending RefL with other inference predicates.
We discuss the need for other predicates at the end of this section, and in Section 4.
Theorem 1. Given the poset of consistent evaluations (E, ≤) and a function I : E → E
which is inflationary and monotonic, I has a least fixed point and a maximal fixed point.
We mention the upper and lower bounds for the complexity of conformance checking w.r.t. the least fixed point. Given a run R and regulation Reg, we say that R |= Reg
iff all obligations are valid in R at the least fixed point. R is assumed to be finite in two
ways: (a) The set of objects O is finite, and (b) There exists n, such that for all j ≥ n,
r(n) = r(j), i.e., R eventually reaches a stable state.
Lemma 2 (Upper Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg can
decided in EXPSPACE (space exponential in the size of Reg)
The upper bound is obtained by turning Corollary 1 into a decision procedure. We
start with the evaluation E0 , and apply I until a fixed point is reached. The worst-case
size of the satisfiability tests are exponential in the size of the regulation. Since testing
satisifiablity for propositional LTL is PSPACE-complete [18], applying I requires EXPSPACE. For the fragment of LTL discussed in this paper (using only 2) satisfiability
is NP-complete [18], and R |= Reg can be decided in EXPTIME.
Lemma 3 (Lower Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg is hard
for EXPTIME (time exponential in the size of Reg)
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The lower bound is shown by a reduction from first order logic enriched with a least
fixed point predicate (the system YF in [21]). With circular references, we can encode
reachability computations that cannot be expressed in first order logic.
Discussion: We now discuss some options in defining conformance, depending on the
needs of the application. The sections of the FDA CFR that we have examined can be
formalized so that there is a unique fixed point, and conformance is simply the satisfaction of obligations at this fixed point.
However, examples discussed in the literature suggest that it may not be desirable
to always have a unique fixed point. A well-known example is that of contrary-to-duty
(CTD) obligations (c.f. [16]). CTD obligations are those that arise when other obligations have been violated. Prakken and Sergot [16] point out an inflexibility in casting
CTD structures as an instance of non-monotonic reasoning. We outline how this inflexibility can be avoided, using alternate definitions of conformance. Consider the following example from [14] (similar to one in [16]): The cottage must not have a fence or a
dog. If it has a dog, then it must have both a fence and a warning sign. The question is
what are the obligations when the cottage has a dog. We discuss two possible solutions.
The first solution is to treat the CTD norm as an exception to the first:
1.o: ¬by{2} (f ∨ d) ; ¬(f ∨ d) and 2.o: d ; f ∧ w
The propositions f , d and w correpond to the cottage having a fence, dog and warning sign resply. Since there is a dog, the precondition of the second law is true, and
this leads to the precondition of the first law being false. So if f ∧ w holds, there is no
violation. However, as [16] points out, it may be useful to detect that the situation is
worse than the one in which there is no dog. In the second solution, we represent the
laws as excluding each other, i.e., we conjoin ¬by{1} (¬(f ∧ w)) to the precondition of
the second law. At the least fixed point, both obligations are ungrounded, and we get
two maximal fixed points – one in which ¬(f ∨ d) is obligated, and one in which f ∧ w
is obligated. Since d holds, there is a violation w.r.t. the former fixed point. In a scenario
where there is no dog, a unique fixed point is obtained.
Our analysis of CTD structures achieves the same effect as the analyses in [16,
14]. However, [16, 14] characterize the CTD norm as presupposing the violation of the
other, and then revising the situation. In future work, we plan to investigate predicates
that capture this presuppositional analysis more directly.

3.4 Axiomatization
As we discussed in the context of Lemma 3, RefL contains first order logic enriched
with a least fixed point predicate. It can be shown that the validity problem is Π11 -hard,
and as a result, it cannot be recursively axiomatized. In this section, we briefly discuss
an axiomatization of the propositional fragment of L′ (the language of preconditions).
We assume as given a fixed finite domain of quantification, and replace variables by
identifiers for domain elements. Given a set of identifiers ID, a propositionalized body
of regulation has one or more statements of the form id.x : ϕ ; ψ for each id ∈ ID.
For example, the presence of id.x : ϕ1 ; ψ1 and id.x : ϕ2 ; ψ2 corresponds to
different assignments to the variables.
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To simplify presentation, we will assume that the references in the regulation are
acyclic. This lets us obtain a unique fixed point and restrict attention to a two-valued
logic. We discuss the general case at the end of this section.
A1
A2
A3
R1
R2

All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
2(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (2ϕ ⇒ 2ψ)
2ϕ ⇒ ϕ ∧ 22ϕ
From ⊢ ϕ ⇒ ψ and ⊢ ϕ, infer ⊢ ψ
From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ 2ϕ

We characterize the inference predicate by the laws it refers to. To axiomatize
byId (ϕ), we need to reason about provability in the language L (propositional LTL).
We say that ϕ ∈ L is is provable (denoted ⊢L ϕ) iff it is an instance of the axioms
A1-A3, or follows from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2. Crucially, we will use
the negation of provability in the premise of a rule. Similar mechanisms have been used
to axiomatize default logic, e.g., in [22], satisfiability is used in the premise of a rule,
and in [23], a modal language is augmented with an operator for satisfiability.
We begin by developing some notation. Given a set of regulatory statements F =
{id1 .x : ϕ1 ; ψ1 , ..., idn .x : ϕn ; ψn }, let Fpre = {ϕ1 , ..., ϕn } be the set of preconditions, Fpost = {ψ1 , ..., ψn } be the set of postconditions, and Fid = {id1 , ..., idn }
be the set of identifiers. Given a finite set of formulas Γ , we denote the conjunction by
V
Γ . The conjunction of the empty set is identified with ⊤ (a tautology). We use two
rules for the inference predicate:
V
V
R3 For all F ⊆ Reg with Fid ⊆ Id, from ⊢L Fpost ⇒ φ, infer ⊢ VFpre ⇒ byId (φ)
R4 For all ψ V
∈ L′ , if for all F ⊆ Reg with Fid ⊆ Id, either 6⊢L Fpost ⇒ φ, or
⊢ ψ ⇒ ¬ Fpre , then infer ⊢ ψ ⇒ ¬byId (φ).
Informally, R3 says that byId (φ) is true, if there exists a set of laws whose postconditions imply φ, and whose preconditions are true. R4 says that byId (φ) is false, if
one of the preconditions
is false for all sets of laws whose postconditions imply φ. In
V
particular, if 6⊢L Fpost ⇒ φ for all appropriate subsets, then ⊢ ⊤ ⇒ ¬byId (φ), and
using R1, ⊢ ¬byid (φ).
The rules have an equivalent axiomatic characterization, which is important in establishing completeness. Given φ ∈ L, letVF(Id,φ) be the set of subsets (F ⊆ Reg
with FV
Fpost ⇒ φ. Let Γ(Id,φ) be the set such
id ⊆ Id) such that F ∈ F iff ⊢L
that
¬
F
∈
Γ
iff
F
∈
F
.
Finally,
let ∆(Id,φ) be the set such that
pre
(Id,φ)
(Id,φ)
V
Fpre ∈ ∆(Id,φ) iff F ∈ F(Id,φ) .
Proposition 3. The following are provable:
V
1. ⊢ Γ(Id,φ) ⇒W¬byId (φ)
2. ⊢ byId (φ) ⇒ ∆(Id,φ)
The first claim is an immediate consequence of R4. And, the second claim follows from
the first by propositional reasoning. It is easy to show that the axioms A1-A3, together
with Proposition 3, and the rules R1 and R2 imply the rules R3 and R4. The inference
predicate behaves like a modality:
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Proposition 4. ⊢ byId (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (byId (ϕ) ⇒ byId (ψ))
Completeness is be established by a standard pre-model construction (see [19] for
details). We now discuss the general case, i.e., when there are circular references and
multiple fixed points. In the presence of multiple fixed points, we can define validity
w.r.t. all fixed points, the least fixed point, or maximal fixed points. The axioms and
rules discussed here can be adapted to characterize valdity w.r.t. all fixed points [19].
However, we have not obtained a direct characterization of validity w.r.t. the least or
maximal fixed points. [22] provides an axiomatization of these three notions of validity
for default logic, by translating the default rules into an autoepistemic logic. A question
of interest is whether the the translation procedure in [22] can be adapted for RefL.

4 Conclusions and Future Work
We have motivated and described a logic (RefL) that accomodates references between
laws. RefL separates two uses of statements – drawing inferences from regulation, and
determining facts about an organization. We believe that this separation is crucial to the
application of conformance checking.
The inference predicate blends two ideas from logic programming. First, the KripkeKleene-Fitting semantics [24], which uses three values for negation in logic programs.
In RefL, we place the burden on a predicate, rather than on negation. The advantage is
that connectives can behave as they do in a many valued logic. Second, contextual logic
programs [25] use operations to restrict the context from which inferences are derived.
Referring to specific laws (via identifiers) gives us a fine-grained control of context.
RefL provides a staring point in bringing the advantages of non-monotonic reasoning to systems such as [2, 4]. [2] represents business contracts as SQL queries, and [4]
uses first-order logic augmented with real time operators. The inference predicate can
be added to these systems, provided that the existential quantification is relativized to either the preconditions or the postconditions. However, restrictions are needed to ensure
that the satisfiability tests remain decidable. [3] discusses the importance of anlayzing
references, but do not provide a formalization.
In this work, we have considered references to laws that appear in preconditions.
There is also the need for references in postconditions. An obvious case is for laws
that cancel obligations and permissions given by another, e.g., if a donation is not used
for transfusion, exemption (3) no longer applies. A more speculative case can be made
for iterated deontic constructs [17], e.g., “required to allow x”. We suggest that the
semantics will involve representing agents who introduce laws that reason about each
other, e.g., You are required to (introduce laws that) allow a patient to see his records.
On the computational side, our goal is to be able to scale up to runs with a large
number of objects, and incorporate RefL into a runtime checking framework for LTL.
In a companion paper [26], we identify a fragment of RefL motivated by a case study
of the FDA CFR. The fragment assumes that byId (ϕ) can be evaluated by using at most
one of the laws referred to. This assumption allows us to replace satisfiability tests with
tests of lower complexity, and lets us scale up to runs with a large number of objects. In
this paper, we have focussed on formally characterizing the semantics and complexity
of RefL, and in [26], we focus on optimizations that are needed in practice.
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